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men eines durch das Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft und Energie geförderten 
Projektes entstand, eine aufschlussreiche 
Lektüre.
Frank Jacob (ed.): Peripheries of the 
Cold War (= Globalhistorische Kom-
parativstudien, vol. 3), Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann 2015, 365 
S.
Reviewed by  
Cyrus Schayegh, Geneva
The viewpoint underlying this volume is 
that the Cold War was not only brought, 
but also pulled, into peripheries and there 
structured by national developments. This 
is not new, Jacob recognizes.1 Still, “there 
are still plenty of national perspectives that 
might enlighten the global and transna-
tional reading of the Cold War,” including 
“the interrelationship between the centers 
and the peripheries” (p. 9). This is correct. 
But Jacob’s volume could have been more 
effective. Editing and indexing are sub-op-
timal, and the Table of Content’s pagina-
tion is annoyingly faulty. The Cold War is 
absent in Nathan McCormack’s “Filastin: 
A Case Study of Intellectual Development 
in the Palestinian Resistance, 1965-1967” 
and present only shortly in Frank Jacob’s 
“MacArthur’s Legacy – Japan and the 
Early Years of the Cold War”. Jacob sorted 
the chapters by places rather than themes, 
which would have compelled him to iden-
tify patterns. And his short introduction 
reflects only in the speediest of fashion on 
his volume’s key term, peripheries, and not 
at all on the chapters’ synergies.
This, then, is the objective of what follows, 
for this volume’s chapters do provide much 
fodder for thought. It is Jacob’s service to 
have brought them together.
I start with “peripheries.” One can use vol-
ume chapters to build two quite opposed 
arguments. One is that location matters. 
A first case is countries bordering com-
munist Eurasia – “front-line participants” 
in the Cold War, to speak with Nikos 
Christofis’ “Turkey and the Cold War” (p. 
255) – which became early and again late 
in the Cold War sites of confrontation and 
tension not the least because they bordered 
communist Eurasia, making them matter 
to both Washington and Moscow. Think 
of Iran, Turkey, Greece, Korea, Iran, Af-
ghanistan, and Vietnam; contrast most of 
Africa, which fully entered the Cold War 
– and truly globalized it, in result – from 
the late 1950s. Second, superpowers in-
fluenced others not like others influenced 
them. The former “direction,” as it were, 
was often direct and bilateral, and meth-
ods ranged widely, from violence to active 
political constraints to decreasing another 
state’s elbowroom to punish-ignore it, as 
Guilherme Casarões’ “Between the U.S. 
and the Deep Blue See: Cold War Policies 
and the Political Breakdown in Brazil” (pp. 
300-302) illustrates beautifully and as Luis 
Herrán-Avila’s “Convergent Conflicts: The 
Cold War and the Origins of Counterin-
surgency State in Colombia (1946-1964)” 
(p. 322) shows, too. By contrast, the latter 
direction was often indirect, and played 
just as often on a superpower’s relationship 
with third parties as on that superpower 
itself, as Jeffrey Shaw’s “The Ogaden War 
– A Case Study of Cold War Politics” (p. 
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101-113) demonstrates. Thus, in a sense, 
when we say that post-colonial countries, 
including Latin America, influenced the 
Cold War superpowers, and not only the 
reverse, we are in a way – and certainly re-
garding methods – comparing apples and 
oranges.
One may use two statements – Shaw’s, 
that the Ogaden War “can be considered 
peripheral to the larger Cold War itself, 
but nonetheless had tremendous influ-
ence over the direction that the Cold 
War would take in the war’s aftermath” 
(p. 101); and Zeyneb Tuba Sungur’s, in 
“Acts of Mistranslation in the Cold War: 
Afghanistan under Soviet Occupation,” 
that Afghanistan “moved from the ‘periph-
ery’ of the Cold War into its ‘core’” in the 
1980s (p. 169) – as a foil against which to 
develop a second argument. The Cold War 
world was not dualistic: (a) center(s) here, 
peripheries there. 
This had various reasons, which for brev-
ity’s sake are represented schematically 
here.
–   the Cold War knew two political-ideo-
logical-military power centers, the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union;
–   these had sub-centers, in (the) West 
(Europe) as well as (the) East (Europe), 
which not unoften – and through time 
tendentially more and more – acted au-
tonomously;
–   from the late 1950s the Soviet Union 
had a real competitor, the PRC; and
–   the post-colonial world, including Latin 
America, was not homogeneous, but 
many countries and actors interacted in 
the most varied fashions and sub-group-
ings among themselves and with various 
“First” and “Second” world countries, as 
for example Casarões shows for Brazil-
ian economic ties with Japan, the FRG, 
and Italy, which mattered also politically 
(p. 303), or as Joseph Parrot’s “Multi-
polar Diplomacy: FRELIMO’s Struggle 
for Independence in the Cold War” (p. 
75) and Jason Morgan’s “Namibian and 
South African Activism at the United 
Nations in the Early Cold War” (p. 99) 
illustrates for ties with Nordic countries.
Partially in consequence,
–   the systems effect of these interactions 
played out globally, meaning that
–   (the) Cold War competition(s) were af-
fected by a wide variety of events and 
points, which in turn means that
–   the distinction between a center – wheth-
er defined geographically or, topically, as 
the central (U.S.-Soviet) conflict – and 
peripheries does not hold water.
Furthermore, even if we would accept the 
notion of peripheries, we’d be confounded 
by the fact that
–   some post-colonial arenas and/or coun-
tries influenced the Cold War much more 
than some First” and “Second” world 
countries, that is, “peripheries” does not 
equal “post-colonial countries;”
–   dividing lines between the First/Second 
world and postcolonial countries are 
not clear-cut, and there are many con-
tact and overlap zones, which on top are 
often historically rich and complex, like 
the Mediterranean2; and
–   some networks straddled North and 
South and/or were present in both, as 
John Aerni-Flesser’s “The Spectre of 
Communism and Local Politics in Leso-
tho, 1952-1970” shows for the Catholic 
Church, whose priests were since the 
1930s present also in the rural hinterland 
and by the 1960s helped lead an anti-
communist charge (pp. 45, 49, 54).
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A second underlying theme of this review 
concerns space(s). For one thing, Aerni-
Flesser and Geoffrey Cain’s “Sihanouk’s 
Folly and the Second Indochinese War: 
The Decline of Cambodian Royalty and 
the Rise of the Military” show that sub-
national locales could influence a country’s 
Cold War behavior. In Lesotho, leftist lo-
cal newspapers mattered as some attended 
firmly to social issues, especially labor 
(p. 46); and Cambodia’s Samlaut rebel-
lion, at first a sub-national peasant revolt, 
ended up spreading through the country, 
supported by the left (pp. 197-199). For 
another thing, despite Jacob’s declared fo-
cus on “national perspectives” (p. 9), no 
chapter is exclusively a country case study, 
and none can neatly divide between the 
national and the transnational and inter-
national. Take the United Nations. It is 
central to Morgan and makes an appear-
ance in Parrot, in Achberger, as an arena 
in which Zambia could keep promises to 
the PRC (pp. 163-166), and in Charles 
Thomas’ “Tanzania: Decolonization, the 
Cold War, and the Creation of a Nation, 
1961–1979”, who notes that “[I]n 1954, 
Nyerere bypassed the colonial authorities 
and courted the United Nations fact-find-
ing mission within Tanganiyka … [and] 
appeared in 1955 before the Trusteeship 
Council of the United Nations” (p. 117). 
Reading these chapters side by side and to-
gether with other projects – for instance 
Jennifer L. Foray ongoing work on In-
dians in New York assisting Indonesians 
to claim independence at the UN in the 
late 1940s; David Stenner’s forthcoming 
monograph on Morocco showing how In-
donesians and others helped Moroccans in 
New York from the early 1950s; and Mat-
thew Connelly’s landmark monograph 
showing how Moroccans aided Algerians 
in New York from the mid-1950s3 – one 
may inquire into cumulative patterns and 
expanding networks at the UNO used to 
gain independence. Also, could we retell 
this story as one blurring and complicat-
ing the boundary between traditional dip-
lomats, activists, and revolutionaries? That 
is, could we write socio-cultural histories 
of “diplomating”, as it were, in a time of 
decolonization, with attention to arenas 
including, but not limited to, the United 
Nations in New York? Such studies could 
draw inspirations from work done on the 
League of Nations.4
Still on space(s), Jessica Achberger’s “Nego-
tiating for Economic Development: Zam-
bia in the Cold War” shows how Zambia 
has an “advanced” – and “diversified,” we 
may add – “foreign relations policy” (pp. 
149, 166). On a similar note, Parrot ar-
gues that FRELIMO was self-consciously 
and explicitly internationalist, indeed felt 
it had to be to survive the Cold War (pp. 
69, 82). In Africa, it nurtured strong ties 
with Algeria and with its Tanzanian neigh-
bor; and it sought to bypass the minefield 
of Cold War bipolarity by “forging strong 
linkages on both sides of the Iron Curtain” 
(p. 63) “to retain not only its indepen-
dence but an international reputation for 
autonomy that would keep open future 
avenues of support” (p. 69). This included 
cooperating with progressive forces in the 
West (p. 73), not only sub-state actors but 
with “peripheral nations like non-NATO 
member Sweden and the other Nordic 
states” that were social-democratic (p. 
75).5 Could one, we may ask, splice such 
periphery-periphery ties with new views of 
the Cold War in Europe that crisscross the 
Iron Curtain, pointing to “multileveled in-
11 | Buchbesprechungen
teraction?”6 Meanwhile, Raquel Ribeiro’s 
“The Cubans in Angola (1975–1991): A 
Cultural Overview” shows how Cuban 
internacionalistas, women and men de-
ployed in Africa, “boosted a collective re-
flection about identity in Cuba” (p. 20). 
They used different transnationally lived 
South-South contexts doubling as Cold 
War arenas – think of Angola – to reenact 
and relive their revolution after it and its 
initial flavor and fervor had passed.7
A last underlying theme concerns time. Re-
garding periodization, Christofis (pp. 265, 
269, 271, 276) on Turkey and Casarões 
(pp. 299-302) on Brazil agree in that while 
superpower behavior helped set rhythms, 
post-colonial grass-roots and elite actions 
mattered just as much if not more. This 
is an important angle from which to con-
tinue considering a foremost question in 
recent studies of the Cold War: intersec-
tions with decolonization.8 On a related 
note, various authors show that many in-
ter-state and inter-personal South-South 
relations that shaped the Cold War period 
within post-colonial countries have deep 
roots, some of which predated the Cold 
War. Ribeiro shows this for the relation-
ship between Fidel Castro and Angola’s 
Agostinho Neto (p. 13). Aerni-Flesser 
demonstrates how Lesotho’s long labor 
history – especially nineteenth-century Ba-
sotho labor migration to South Africa, and 
the involvement of a few Basothos in the 
South African communist party from the 
1920s – helped shape Lesotho’s reception 
of communism after World War II (p. 42). 
Casarões notes Brazil’s interwar relation-
ship with the United States and its echoes 
in post-war policies and expectations (pp. 
285-288). And Herrán-Avila mentions the 
roles, in Colombia’s counterinsurgency, of 
a U.S. ex-colonial police officer originally 
stationed in Manila and of a Colombian 
student of French counterinsurgency (pp. 
329, 332 n154).
To conclude, Jacob could have curated this 
edited volume better and drawn analytical 
conclusions. But the geographical range, 
certain authors’ arguments, and many 
events described and marginal notes allow 
one to employ this book to continue re-
flecting on the Cold War and its complex 
interplay with decolonization.
Notes:
1  Jacob inter alia cites (on pp. 7n15, 8n25, and 
9n29, respectively) J. Suri, The Cold War, De-
colonization, and Global Social Awakening. 
Historical Intersections, in: Cold War History 6 
(2006), p. 353-363; O. A. Westad, The Global 
Cold War, Cambridge 2005; and R. McMahon, 
The Cold War on the Periphery. The United 
States, India, and Pakistan, New York 1996.
2  See e.g. Rinna Kullaa’s RUSMED project, fo-
cusing on Russian and European relations with 
Mediterranean countries which became inde-
pendent after WWII: Algeria, Syria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Cyprus and the former 
Yugoslavia.
3 J. Foray, Go Fight Us in New York. The United 
Nations and the Origins of Postwar Decoloni-
zation, lecture, Graduate Institute Geneva, 14 
November 2017; D. Stenner, Globalizing Mo-
rocco, Monograph Manuscript; M. Connelly, A 
Diplomatic Revolution. Algeria’s Fight for Inde-
pendence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War 
Era, Oxford 2002.
4 See www.lonsea.de, the League of Nations 
Search Engine, which bundles information 
about thousands of people who networked at 
and through Geneva.
5 Stenner, Globalizing Morocco, makes a similar 
point.
6 S. Autio-Sarasmo, K. Miklóssy, Introduction, in: 
idem (eds.), Reassessing Cold War Europe, New 
York 2011, p. 1-15.
7 Philip Casula made a similar argument in “So-
viet Travelers to the Middle East: Searching Mo-
dernity and a True Soviet Self during the Cold 
War,” paper, conference “Transnational relations 
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between Eastern Europe/USSR and the Middle 
East,” Geneva, 22-23 February 2018.
8 See e.g. the subtle changes Westad made from 
idem, Global Cold War to idem, The Cold 
War. A World History, New York 2017, which 
is somewhat more agnostic about the weight of 
decolonization in Cold War developments. See 
also e.g. P. Duara, The Cold War as a Historical 
Period. An Interpretive Essay, in: Journal of Glo-
bal History 6 (2011), p. 457-480.
Rita Chin: The Crisis of Multicultura-
lism in Europe. A History, Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press 2017, 363 p.
Reviewed by  
Marian Burchardt, Leipzig
In this book, Rita Chin tries to understand 
what is behind the statement, frequently 
made by politicians across Western Eu-
rope especially since 2010, that multicul-
turalism has failed. In order to do so, she 
suggests that it is necessary to trace how 
multicultural societies emerged in Europe 
in the first place.
Chin’s study places the beginning of mul-
ticultural Europe at the emergence of the 
post-World War Two political and social 
order with the first large-scale immigra-
tion of people of non-European origin. 
Following the introduction in which Chin 
situates her analysis in the context of on-
going political debates on immigration 
and diversity, the authors takes the reader 
on a huge interestingly journey through 
histories of immigration, the politics and 
economics that have shaped the different 
phases of these histories as well as the po-
litical and larger public discourses where-
by political actors have conceptualized 
immigration, nationhood, diversity and 
multiculturalism. Focusing on the UK, 
France, Germany and to a lower degree 
the Netherlands, Chin shows how immi-
gration emerged from the different histori-
cal scenarios of these countries after World 
War Two forging two basic patterns: one 
in which imperial and colonial histories 
shaped routes of migration, institutional 
pathways of recognition and nascent forms 
of coexistence (Britain, France and the 
Netherlands); and another one in which 
immigration resulted from the need for la-
bor (Germany). In many cases, politicians’ 
attitudes towards questions of migration 
and integration had to do with their lo-
cation within the political spectrum, with 
left-leaning politicians usually favoring 
policies that promoted immigrants’ rights 
and conservatives arguing for tight immi-
gration controls and promoting discourses 
that championed national cohesion and 
warned against national fragmentation. 
However, skillfully moving between diffe-
rent political and levels, historical periods 
and regional subnational scenarios, Chin 
shows that this was not always the case 
and that there was variation. In particular, 
leftist politicians’ support for migration 
was sometimes qualified by concerns over 
workers’ rights and social justice. Left-li-
berals, in turn, have become over the last 
decades more hesitant to support migra-
tion as discourses about the lacking sup-
port of migrants, in particular Muslims, 
for liberal values and rights became more 
entrenched.
While the book provides a welcome hi-
storical contextualization for many of the 
